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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-1749

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MARIO SANTIAGO-BAUTISTA,
a/k/a JESUS CARMONA
a/k/a MARIO SANTIAGO
Mario Santiago-Bautista,
Appellant

On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction and Sentence
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00915-1)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 24, 2008
___________
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 4, 2008)

OPINION

McKee, Circuit Judge:

Mario Santiago-Bautista appeals the sentence of 19 months’ imprisonment that
was imposed after he pled guilty to illegal reentry following deportation, in violation of 8
U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). He challenges the district court’s conclusion that his prior
New Jersey state conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon constituted an
“aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), thereby subjecting him to an eightlevel increase in his base offense level. The government argues that any error was
harmless because the district court articulated an alternative ground for the sentence that
was imposed that makes Santiago-Bautista’s challenge irrelevant. Because we agree that
any error in the calculation of the applicable Guideline range was harmless, we will
affirm.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we discuss only the
background necessary to our brief opinion.1 At sentencing, the district court imposed a
custodial sentence of 19 months based on two independent grounds. The district court

1

The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review factual findings relevant
to the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error and we exercise plenary review over a district
court’s interpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d
Cir. 2007) (en banc). “In deciding whether the alleged error was harmless, ‘a court of
appeals must decide whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence
had it not relied upon the invalid factor or factors.’” United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d
208, 212 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)).
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concluded that violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)2 constituted a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b), resulting in an offense level 13, criminal history category 3, and
yielding an advisory Guideline range of 18 to 24 months. However, the court went on to
explain that even if that legal conclusion was incorrect (and the offense level should have
been 10), the court would nevertheless have “var[ied] up 2 points, and using a range of 15
to 21 months, impose[d] a sentence of 19 months.” App. 101. This variance would be
based on “the nature and circumstances of this defendant, . . . [the] nature and
circumstances of the offense, [his] violent act regarding Miss Chan,3 prior membership in
a gang, his lack of candor [towards] law enforcement, and his use of fraudulent
documentation.” Id. The court further explained that such a sentence would address
some concerns about danger to the public, as well as “reflect the seriousness of the
reentry,” and “promote respect for the law.” Id.
Thus the court clearly considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

2

That statute provides in pertinent part:

Any person who knowingly has in his possession any other weapon under
circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may
have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).
3

This is a reference to the prior conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon.
According to the arrest report, his girlfriend (Ms. Chan) told officers that “Santiago
threatened her with a hammer by putting the claw edge against her face and then told her
that he would ‘stab her in the stomach repeatedly’ if she left him or gets him ‘locked
up.’” PSR ¶ 30. Ms. Chan had some visible injuries.
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3553(a) when imposing this sentence. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude
that even assuming arguendo that the district court erred in its analysis of Defendant’s
prior conviction, that error was harmless as the court would have imposed the same
sentence anyway for the reasons it explained. We are convinced that the district court
engaged in a careful and extensive explanation of the reasoning underlying the sentence
under either Guidelines framework. We find no error in the alternate sentence, nor do we
find any merit in Santiago-Bautista’s argument that a district court abuses its discretion
when it articulates an alternate sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgement of the district court.
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